Extended attr cert verification; fix failing on any attr cert extension

Author: JonathanWilbur

apps/acert.c

@@ -180,130 +180,6 @@ static int duplicated(LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *addexts, char *kv)
     return 0;
 }
 
-static int X509_ACERT_verify_cert (X509_ACERT *acert, X509 *holder, X509 *issuer) {
-    int ret = 0;
-    OSSL_ISSUER_SERIAL *basecertid;
-    const GENERAL_NAMES *holder_ent;
-    const X509_NAME *entity;
-    AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid;
-
-    int holder_verified = 0;
-
-    if (ossl_x509_check_acert_exts(acert) != X509_V_OK)
-        goto out;
-
-    /*
-     * Check that holder cert matches attribute cert holder field.
-     * This can be done withi *either* the baseCertificateId or the
-     * entityName.  RFC 5755 recommends that only one option is used
-     * for a given AC, but in case both are present, baseCertificateId
-     * takes precedence.
-     */
-    if ((basecertid = X509_ACERT_get0_holder_baseCertId(acert)) != NULL) {
-        if (X509_NAME_cmp(OSSL_ISSUER_SERIAL_get0_issuer(basecertid),
-                          X509_get_issuer_name(holder)) != 0
-            || ASN1_STRING_cmp(OSSL_ISSUER_SERIAL_get0_serial(basecertid),
-                               X509_get0_serialNumber(holder)) != 0) {
-            goto out;
-        }
-        holder_verified = 1;
-    }
-
-    if (holder_verified == 0
-            && (holder_ent = X509_ACERT_get0_holder_entityName(acert)) != NULL
-            && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(holder_ent) >= 1) {
-        GENERAL_NAMES *holderAltNames;
-        GENERAL_NAME *entName = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(holder_ent, 0);
-        int i;
-
-        if (entName->type == GEN_DIRNAME
-            && X509_NAME_cmp(entName->d.directoryName, X509_get_subject_name(holder)) == 0)
-            holder_verified = 1;
-
-        if (holder_verified == 0
-            && (holderAltNames = X509_get_ext_d2i(holder, NID_subject_alt_name,
-                                                  NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
-            for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(holderAltNames); i++) {
-                GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(holderAltNames, i);
-
-                if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(name, entName) == 0) {
-                    holder_verified = 1;
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (holder_verified == 0) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Check that issuer cert matches attribute cert issuer field,
-     * and AKID if present.
-     */
-    if ((entity = X509_ACERT_get0_issuerName(acert)) == NULL
-            || X509_NAME_cmp(entity, X509_get_subject_name(issuer)) != 0) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Check that the issuer satisfies the AC issuer profile in
-     * RFC 5755 Section 4.5.  This will also cache the attached
-     * X509v3 extensions, which must be done before calling
-     * X509_check_akid() and X509_check_ca() to get valid results.
-     */
-    if ((X509_get_key_usage(issuer) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE);
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    /* TODO: wrap this in X509_ACERT_get_ext_d2i) */
-    if ((akid = X509V3_get_d2i(acert->acinfo->extensions,
-                               NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL))
-             != NULL) {
-        if (X509_check_akid(issuer, akid))
-            goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (X509_ACERT_verify(acert, X509_get0_pubkey(issuer)) <= 0) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * extensions have been cached by X509_get_key_usage(), so X509_check_ca()
-     * can't fail and will only return 0 if `issuer` is not a CA.
-     * 
-     * It does not seem to be specified in ITU Recommendation X.509, but IETF
-     * RFC 5755 states in Section 4.5 that an AC issuer MUST NOT be a PKC
-     * issuer.
-     * 
-     * In my opinion, however, validation should simply be ambivalent.
-     */
-    // if (X509_check_ca(issuer) != 0) {
-    //     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA);
-    //     goto out;
-    // }
-
-    if (X509_cmp_time(X509_ACERT_get0_notBefore(acert), NULL) > 0) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID);
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    if (X509_cmp_time(X509_ACERT_get0_notAfter(acert), NULL) < 0) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED);
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    ret = 1;
-
-out:
-    return ret;
-}
-
 int acert_main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
     ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
@@ -691,12 +567,13 @@ int acert_main(int argc, char **argv)
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Holder certificate could not be loaded.\n");
             goto end;
         }
-        if (X509_ACERT_verify_cert(acert, holder, AAcert) <= 0) {
-            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Attribute certificate verification failed.\n");
+        ret = X509_attr_cert_verify_ex(acert, AAcert, holder, NULL, 0);
+        if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Attribute certificate is invalid.\n");
             goto end;
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Attribute certificate is valid.\n");
         }
-        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Attribute certificate is valid.\n");
     }
 
     if (noout && !text) {