Merge pull request #30 from TrustedComputingGroup/cli_fixes

Cli fixes

Author: JonathanWilbur

apps/acert.c

@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
     OPT_DAYS, OPT_SET_SERIAL, OPT_STARTDATE, OPT_ENDDATE,
     OPT_ADDEXT, OPT_ACERTEXTS,
     OPT_SECTION,
-    OPT_PROV_ENUM, OPT_MD
+    OPT_PROV_ENUM, OPT_MD,
+    OPT_ASSERTED_BEFORE, OPT_TARGET_CERT
 } OPTION_CHOICE;
 
 const OPTIONS acert_options[] = {
@@ -104,6 +105,10 @@ const OPTIONS acert_options[] = {
      "Additional cert extension key=value pair (may be given more than once)"},
     {"acertexts", OPT_ACERTEXTS, 's',
      "Attribute certificate extension section (override value in config file)"},
+    {"asserted-before", OPT_ASSERTED_BEFORE, '-',
+     "Fail verification if the attribute certificate contains the singleUse extension."},
+    {"target-cert", OPT_TARGET_CERT, '<',
+     "The target certificate path to check against the targetingInformation extension"},
 
     OPT_SECTION("Signing"),
     {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"},
@@ -189,21 +194,25 @@ int acert_main(int argc, char **argv)
     EVP_PKEY_CTX *genctx = NULL;
     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL, *sigopts = NULL;
     LHASH_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *addexts = NULL;
-    X509 *AAcert = NULL, *holder = NULL;
+    X509 *AAcert = NULL, *holder = NULL, *target_x509 = NULL;
+    TARGET_CERT *target_cert = NULL;
+    OSSL_ISSUER_SERIAL *target_iss_ser = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *target_cert_name = NULL;
+    TARGET *target = NULL;
     X509_ACERT *acert = NULL;
     BIO *addext_bio = NULL;
     const char *infile = NULL, *AAfile = NULL, *AAkeyfile = NULL;
-    const char *holderfile = NULL;
+    const char *holderfile = NULL, *targetfile = NULL;
     int hldr_basecertid = 0, hldr_entity = 0;
     char *outfile = NULL, *digest = NULL;
     char *keyalgstr = NULL, *p, *prog;
     char *passin = NULL, *passinarg = NULL;
     char *acert_exts = NULL;
-    X509_NAME *fsubj = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *fsubj = NULL, *target_subj = NULL;
     char *template = default_config_file;
     OPTION_CHOICE o;
     int days = DEFAULT_DAYS;
-    int ret = 1, i = 0, newacert = 0, verbose = 0;
+    int ret = 1, i = 0, newacert = 0, verbose = 0, asserted_before = 0;
     int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, keyform = FORMAT_UNDEF;
     int verify = 0, noout = 0, text = 0;
     unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, certflag = 0;
@@ -310,6 +319,12 @@ int acert_main(int argc, char **argv)
         case OPT_ENDDATE:
             enddate = opt_arg();
             break;
+        case OPT_ASSERTED_BEFORE:
+            asserted_before = 1;
+            break;
+        case OPT_TARGET_CERT:
+            targetfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
         case OPT_DAYS:
             days = atoi(opt_arg());
             if (days < -1) {
@@ -559,15 +574,29 @@ int acert_main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
 
     if (verify) {
-        if (holderfile == NULL) {
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "'-holder' option required to verify.\n");
-            goto end;
-        }
-        if (holder == NULL) {
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Holder certificate could not be loaded.\n");
-            goto end;
+        if (targetfile) {
+            if ((target_x509 = load_cert_pass(targetfile, FORMAT_UNDEF, 1, passin,
+                                        "target certificate")) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            target_iss_ser = OSSL_ISSUER_SERIAL_new();
+            if (OSSL_ISSUER_SERIAL_set1_issuer(target_iss_ser, X509_get_issuer_name(target_x509)) == 0)
+                goto end;
+            if (OSSL_ISSUER_SERIAL_set1_serial(target_iss_ser, X509_get_serialNumber(target_x509)) == 0)
+                goto end;
+
+            target_cert_name = GENERAL_NAME_new();
+            target_subj = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(target_x509));
+            if (target_subj == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(target_cert_name, GEN_DIRNAME, target_subj);
+            target_cert = TARGET_CERT_new();
+            target_cert->targetCertificate = target_iss_ser;
+            target_cert->targetName = target_cert_name;
+            target = TARGET_new();
+            target->type = TGT_TARGET_CERT;
+            target->choice.targetCert = target_cert;
         }
-        ret = X509_attr_cert_verify_ex(acert, AAcert, holder, NULL, 0);
+        ret = X509_attr_cert_verify_ex(acert, AAcert, holder, target, asserted_before);
         if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Attribute certificate is invalid.\n");
             goto end;

doc/build.info

@@ -2879,6 +2879,10 @@ DEPEND[html/man3/X509_add_cert.html]=man3/X509_add_cert.pod
 GENERATE[html/man3/X509_add_cert.html]=man3/X509_add_cert.pod
 DEPEND[man/man3/X509_add_cert.3]=man3/X509_add_cert.pod
 GENERATE[man/man3/X509_add_cert.3]=man3/X509_add_cert.pod
+DEPEND[html/man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.html]=man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.pod
+GENERATE[html/man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.html]=man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.pod
+DEPEND[man/man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.3]=man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.pod
+GENERATE[man/man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.3]=man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.pod
 DEPEND[html/man3/X509_check_ca.html]=man3/X509_check_ca.pod
 GENERATE[html/man3/X509_check_ca.html]=man3/X509_check_ca.pod
 DEPEND[man/man3/X509_check_ca.3]=man3/X509_check_ca.pod
@@ -3625,6 +3629,7 @@ html/man3/X509_STORE_new.html \
 html/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.html \
 html/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.html \
 html/man3/X509_add_cert.html \
+html/man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.html \
 html/man3/X509_check_ca.html \
 html/man3/X509_check_host.html \
 html/man3/X509_check_issued.html \
@@ -4262,6 +4267,7 @@ man/man3/X509_STORE_new.3 \
 man/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.3 \
 man/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.3 \
 man/man3/X509_add_cert.3 \
+man/man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.3 \
 man/man3/X509_check_ca.3 \
 man/man3/X509_check_host.3 \
 man/man3/X509_check_issued.3 \

doc/man1/openssl-acert.pod.in

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ B<openssl> B<acert>
 [B<-holder> I<filename>]
 [B<-use-holder-basecertid>]
 [B<-use-holder-name>]
+[B<-target-cert>]
+[B<-asserted-before>]
 [B<-AA> I<filename>|I<uri>]
 [B<-AAkey> I<filename>|I<uri>]
 [B<-keyform> B<DER>|B<PEM>|B<P12>|B<ENGINE>]
@@ -121,6 +123,24 @@ holder in the new attribute certificate.
 Use the holder certificate's subject name to identify the holder
 in the new attribute certificate.
 
+=item B<-target-cert> I<filename>
+
+The target certificate file, from which a TARGET (using the targetCert
+alternative) is constructed and compared against the targets listed in the
+targetingInformation X.509v3 extension, if it is present. This argument takes
+effect if the B<acert> command is used with the B<-verify> option.
+
+Verification will not fail if the targetingInformation extension does not
+exist in the verified attribute certificate, but it will fail if the extension
+is present and the target does not appear in the list of targets.
+
+=item B<-asserted-before>
+
+Specifies whether the verified attribute certificate has been asserted once
+before. If provided, this causes verification of an attribute certificate to
+fail if the singleUse X.509v3 extension is present. This argument only takes
+effect if the B<acert> command is used with the B<-verify> option.
+
 =item B<-AA> I<filename>|I<uri>
 
 Specifies the Attribute Authority certificate to be used for signing with the

doc/man3/X509_attr_cert_verify.pod

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_attr_cert_verify, X509_attr_cert_verify_ex, acert_crl
+- attribute certificate verification functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ int X509_attr_cert_verify(X509_ACERT *acert, X509 *issuer);
+ int X509_attr_cert_verify_ex(X509_ACERT *acert, X509 *issuer, X509 *holder,
+                              TARGET *tgt, int asserted_before);
+ int acert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509_ACERT *x);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_attr_cert_verify verifies that the attribute ceritifcate B<acert> is signed
+by the issuer B<issuer> and that the attribute certificate is valid with
+respect to its validity times and its extensions. This function does B<not>
+verify the B<issuer> certificate.
+
+X509_attr_cert_verify_ex is the extended form of X509_attr_cert_verify, which
+takes an optional B<holder> argument, B<tgt> argument, and B<asserted_before>
+argument.
+
+If not B<NULL>, the subject and subject alternative names are extracted from
+the B<holder> public key certificate and compared against the holder field of
+the asserted attribute certificate, B<acert>.
+
+If not B<NULL>, the target is checked against the list of permitted targets
+within the targetingInformation X.509v3 extension, if the extension is present.
+
+If set to a truthy value, B<asserted_before> causes attribute certificate
+verification to fail if the singleUse X.509v3 extension is present.
+
+acert_crl returns 1 if the attribute certificate B<x> is not revoked in the
+certificate revocation list B<crl>, some other integer otherwise.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions verify an X.509 attribute certificate to varying degrees. None
+of them verify the corresponding public key certificate, but the public key
+certificates can just be verified using the normal OpenSSL verification
+functions.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+Both X509_attr_cert_verify and X509_attr_cert_verify_ex return X509_V_OK (0) if
+the attribute certificate is valid with respect to the supplied verification
+parameters, or some other X509_V_ERR_ value otherwise. As stated above,
+acert_crl returns 1 if the attribute certificate is not revoked in the provided
+certificate revocation list, and some other integer otherwise.
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright 2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
+
+=cut