RVD#3317: MAVLink version handshaking allows for an attacker to bypass authentication

[vmayoral]

id: 3317
title: 'RVD#3317: MAVLink version handshaking allows for an attacker to bypass authentication'
type: vulnerability
description:  The Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol presents authentication
  mechanisms on its version 2.0 however according to its documentation, in order to
  maintain backwards compatibility, GCS and autopilot negotiate the version via the
  AUTOPILOT_VERSION message. Since this negotiation depends on the answer, 
  an attacker may craft packages in a way that hints the autopilot to adopt version
  1.0 of MAVLink for the communication. Given the lack of authentication capabilities
  in such version of MAVLink (refer to CVE-2020-10282), attackers may use this method
  to bypass authentication capabilities and interact with the autopilot directly.
cwe: CWE-288
cve: CVE-2020-10283
keywords:
- MAVLink
- v1.0
- v2.0
- PX4
- Ardupilot
system: MAVLink
vendor: "PX4"
severity:
  rvss-score: 8.0
  rvss-vector: RVSS:1.0/AV:AN/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/Y:T/C:H/I:H/A:H/H:U
  severity-description: high
  cvss-score: 8.1
  cvss-vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
links:
- https://mavlink.io/en/guide/mavlink_version.html#version_handshaking
- https://mavlink.io/en/messages/common.html#AUTOPILOT_VERSION
- https://github.com/aliasrobotics/RVD/issues/3316
flaw:
  phase: unknown
  specificity: subject-specific
  architectural-location: platform code
  application: Flying vehicles and/or others using MAVLink protocol.
  subsystem: communication
  package: N/A
  languages: C, C++
  date-detected: '2020-06-30'
  detected-by: "Victor Mayoral Vilches (Alias Robotics)"
  detected-by-method: testing
  date-reported: '2020-06-30'
  reported-by: "Victor Mayoral Vilches (Alias Robotics)"
  reported-by-relationship: security researcher
  issue: https://github.com/aliasrobotics/RVD/issues/3317
  reproducibility: always
  trace: N/A
  reproduction: N/A
  reproduction-image: N/A
exploitation:
  description: Not available at the moment, PoC might be built in the future if resources are available.
  exploitation-image: Not available
  exploitation-vector: Not available
  exploitation-recipe: ''
mitigation:
  description: Not available
  pull-request: N/A
  date-mitigation: null

[vmayoral]

This vulnerability needs further triaged. It has been produced from my readings of the documentation and source code but now PoC is available at the moment.

[glerapic]

Aside from a PoC, and a possible mitigation this looks good to me as is.

[vmayoral]

Yeap, I don't have bandwith nor resources now for putting together a PoC but I'm somewhat confident this should be feasible. Leaving it as triage required.

Hopefully we'll get resources to fund further research and work things like this out.

[vmayoral]

Confirmed simple PoC. Referring back to #3316.

[auturgy]

Can you provide details of your PoC? In ArduPilot signing is available, so for this vulnerability to be real you'd need to be able to inject a valid message into a signed MAVLink2 stream, and have it parsed and actioned - without a valid signing key. I'd like to see proof that that is possible - else you should remove ArduPilot from this vulnerability. If you read your own links above, from the MAVLink documentation "If signing is enabled then the vehicle should immediately start sending signed MAVLink 2 on startup".